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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3063 
 ___________ 
 
JOSE FREMONDE XENOS,  
                                          Appellant 
v. 
 
ROBERT CORVINO, POSTAL CLERK AND SNITCH IN HIS PRIVATE AND 
MINISTERIAL CAPACITIES; TAMMY THOMAS, POSTAL SUPERVISOR IN 
HER PRIVATE AND MINISTERIAL CAPACITIES; JOE SARNOSINSKI, 
POSTAL SUPERINTENDENT IN HIS MINISTERIAL CAPACITY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-04846) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James Knoll Gardner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 2, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 








 Jose Fremonde Xenos appeals from an order of the United States District 
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which denied his motion for 
appointment of counsel and granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Xenos’ 
complaint.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
I. 
 In his complaint, Xenos raised claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985, and the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Xenos stated 
that he had previously filed a complaint against Robert Corvino, a postal 
employee.  Xenos complained that after Corvino was served with the complaint, 
“Corvino began to discriminate against plaintiff when he would come to the post 
office for service by denying him service, acting in a hysterical and threatening 
manner and scream[ing] at Xenos . . . .”  Xenos alleged he was denied service on 
September 9, 2008, and that he called Corvino’s supervisor, Tammy Thomas, who 
suggested that he might want to go to a different post office.  When Xenos went 
back to the same post office on September 15, 2008, Corvino “began to act 
threatening and screaming that he was going to call the police.”  Xenos called 
Thomas again, who advised him not to go to that post office again.  Xenos alleged 
that Corvino then filed a complaint with the Bethlehem police.  Xenos also 
complained that postal superintendent Joe Sarnosinski was never available to take 
his calls and was derelict in his duty for allowing the discrimination.  Xenos sought 
$1000/day in damages. 
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 The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6), noting that Xenos had failed to identify any statutory or constitutional 
right that was violated by Corvino’s or Thomas’s actions.  Soon thereafter, Xenos 
filed a motion for appointment of counsel.  In an order entered May 4, 2010, the 
District Court, without mentioning the motion for appointment of counsel, directed 
Xenos to respond to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss by May 21, 2010. 
 On May 19, 2010, Xenos filed a response to the Court’s order, complaining 
that the Court should not have allowed Defendants to file the motion to dismiss out 
of time, and complaining that the judge was biased against civil rights plaintiffs.  
Xenos cited caselaw stating that filings by a pro se plaintiff should be construed 
liberally.  He also noted that he had spent 90 days in a mental hospital, and thus he 
could not represent himself.  He cited no other caselaw or arguments in opposition 
to the motion to dismiss.  He also asked the Court to “take no further action until 
effective counsel has been assigned to this case.” 
 The District Court entered an order denying Xenos’ motion for appointment 
of counsel, and granting the motion to dismiss as unopposed, relying on Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 7.1(c).  See E.D. Pa. R. 7.1(c) (“In the absence 
of a timely response, the motion may be granted as uncontested . . . .”).  In a 
footnote, the Court stated that Xenos had failed to adequately brief his opposition 
to the motion to dismiss, and stated that his pro se status did not excuse him from 
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responding to the arguments in the motion. 
 Xenos timely appealed.  In his brief, he challenges only the District Court’s 
decision to deny him appointment of counsel. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court=s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  See Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  In doing so, we “accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, 
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Id. at 233 (citation and quotation omitted).  
The factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”  Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  Pro se complaints, however, must be “liberally 
construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.”  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 We recently affirmed an order of the District Court involving another 
complaint filed by Xenos.  See Xenos v. Hawbecker, 441 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 
2011) (not precedential).  In that case, the District Court had similarly denied 
Xenos’ motion for appointment of counsel and had granted the defendants’ motion 
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to dismiss as unopposed because Xenos had failed to present a fully developed 
legal argument against dismissal.  We noted that dismissal of Xenos’ complaint as 
“unopposed” was in essence “a sanction for failure to comply with the local court 
rule,” and that “such a sanction should not be invoked lightly when the plaintiff is 
pro se and the record evinces an intent to oppose dismissal, regardless of the 
plaintiff’s noncompliance with local procedure.”  Xenos, 441 F. App’x at 131 
(citing Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)).  We further 
noted that such a dismissal requires a district court to “analyze the relevant factors 
set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.1984), 
before concluding that the sanction of dismissal is warranted.” 1
 The District Court here did not provide an analysis pursuant to Poulis.  
Nevertheless, as with the previous case, we will affirm on alternative grounds 
because Xenos’ claims lack merit.
 Xenos, 441 F. 
App’x at 131.   
2
                                                 
1 The six factors are:  (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) 
prejudice to the adversary; (3) any history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the party 
acted willfully or in bad faith; (5) the availability of alternative sanctions; and (6) 
the merit of the claim or defense.  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
 
  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d 
2  We recognize that technically, Xenos has only challenged the District Court’s 
decision to deny him appointment of counsel.  However, because a decision about 
whether to appoint counsel is tethered to an analysis of whether the complaint has 
merit, and because we liberally construe his pro se brief to challenge the dismissal 
of his complaint, we proceed directly to a discussion of the merits of Xenos’ case.  
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Cir. 2011) (“We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the 
record.”).  Xenos has not identified any constitutional or statutory right that was 
violated by the Defendants.  It is not clear why he invoked the Ninth Amendment, 
but it is clear, in any event, that the Amendment does not extend to this mine-run 
fact pattern.  Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 605 n. 26 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (en banc).  Xenos has not identified any statutory or constitutional right 
to use a particular post office.  See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (First Amendment does not 
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by 
government).  As Appellees note, postal regulations allow the Postal Service to 
restrict a person’s use of the post office “by prohibiting the destruction of postal 
property, requiring patrons to comply with official signs, prohibiting disorderly 
conduct or conduct that obstructs a postal employee’s ability to perform his job 
duties, and prohibiting solicitation and advertisement activities.  39 C.F.R. 
§ 232.1(a)-(e), (h) (2006).”  Appellees’ Brief at 15.  Xenos was not restricted from 
using postal facilities, but was only denied service by a particular clerk on two 
occasions.  Xenos has not explained how Corvino or Thomas violated any of his 
rights.   
                                                                                                                                                             
See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (in deciding whether to 
appoint counsel, court must determine, as a threshold matter, if claim has arguable 
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 Assuming that Xenos was attempting to raise a claim that Defendants 
retaliated against him for filing a lawsuit against Corvino, his claim fails.  
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, Corvino’s actions were not so 
egregious as to deter an ordinary person from exercising his First Amendment 
rights, and Thomas’s suggestions that Xenos use a different post office did not 
cause him any harm.  See Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (key question in determining whether cognizable First Amendment 
claim has been stated is whether alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient to deter 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights).  We further 
agree with Appellees that to the extent Xenos raised claims against them in official 
capacities, such claims would be barred by sovereign immunity.  United States v. 
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).   
 Because Xenos’ claims are without merit, the District Court properly denied 
his motion for appointment of counsel, and properly dismissed his complaint.  For 
the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
                                                                                                                                                             
merit in fact and law). 
